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1 network basic input/output system
"An application programming interface (API) that can be used by programs on a local area network (LAN). NetBIOS provides programs with a uniform set of commands for requesting the lower-level services required to manage names, conduct sessions, and send datagrams between nodes on a network."نظام إدخال/إخراج أساسي للشبكةEnglish-Arabic terms dictionary > network basic input/output system
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2 BP
1) Общая лексика: hum. сокр. Base Pair, начальный период (beginning period), передовая практика, оптимальная практика (best practice)2) Компьютерная техника: Basic Programs, Build Page, Business Portal3) Морской термин: ОП4) Медицина: Bodily Pain, bipolar disorder, blood pressure, binding potential, bullous pemphigoid5) Американизм: Brain Power6) Спорт: Ball Park, Ban Points, Baton Pass, Batting Practice, Battle Points, Belt Punch, Big Point, Bouncer Points, Bravery Points7) Военный термин: Battery Pack, Battle Power, Battlefield Position, Binding Post, Bow Problem, Brilliant Pebbles, Burning The Planet, back projection, base percussion, base plate, base procured, basic pay, battle position, beach party, black powder, blackout preparedness, blast propagation, border patrol, bypass8) Техника: Bloch point, Boolean processor, Bulk Pulverizer, band of performance, batch program, bearing pile, bill of parcels, bills-payable, bipolar, bit processing, blocking probability, bonded single paper, breakpoint, brick protected, bright plating, bulk processing, byte processing, водосброс, обходная выработка, перемычка, перепускное устройство, полосовой фильтр, сбросовый канал, ходок, шунт9) Шутливое выражение: Bad Petroleum, Boycott Petrol, Brain Poping, Bull Plop10) Математика: Bivariate Poisson, Branching Point11) Юридический термин: Bristol Police12) Бухгалтерия: Big Pockets, Billing Provider, Budget Power13) Фармакология: Британская фармакопея14) Биржевой термин: Basis Points15) Ветеринария: Bond Pair16) Грубое выражение: Baby Prostitute, Big Pimp, Bride Price17) Музыка: Bass Player18) Оптика: buff polish19) Политика: Solomon Islands20) Радио: Battery Powered21) Сокращение: Boiling Point, Brazilian Portuguese, Broken Pekoe, Bulk Posting, between perpendiculars, bolted plate, British Pharmacopoeia, back pressure22) Университет: Bonus Points23) Физика: Before Polarization24) Физиология: Blood Pollution, Body Part25) Электроника: Band Pass26) Вычислительная техника: back propagation, base pointer, указатель базы, Base Pointer (register, CPU, Intel, Assembler)27) Нефть: bridge plug, bulk plant, bull plug, базисный распределительный склад, барометрическое давление (barometric pressure), глухая башмачная насадка (blind plug), глухая пробка (blind plug), мостовая пробка (bridge plug), нефтебаза (bulk plant), обратное давление (back pressure), противодавление (back pressure)28) Стоматология: BOP, КЗ, индекс кровоточивости при зондировании, кровоточивость при зондировании, показатель кровоточивости при зондировании29) Картография: bearing picket, boundary post, by-pass30) Банковское дело: векселя к уплате (bills payable)31) Транспорт: Balanced Pistons32) Пищевая промышленность: Baked Potato, Black Pepper, British Pigs33) Парфюмерия: фармакопея Великобритании34) Фирменный знак: Blair Petroleum, Brass Plum, British Pharmaceutical35) Реклама: Патент Великобритании36) СМИ: Back Print, Begin Picture, Bermuda Press37) Деловая лексика: Best Product, Better Petroleum, Beyond Petroleum, Big Polluter, Business Plus, Business Population, Buying The Power38) Бурение: бирпо (Bearpaw; свита серии мотана верхнего отдела меловой системы), основание пенсильванской свиты (Base Pennsylvanian), распределительный склад (bulk plant)39) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Bid Packages & Procurement Services, температура кипения (boiling point), точка кипения (boiling point)40) Инвестиции: bills payable41) Сетевые технологии: Broken Proxy42) ЕБРР: Board package43) Полимеры: British Patent, British Petroleum, bandpass, base point, blast pressure, blueprint44) Программирование: Buffer Previous45) Автоматика: base pitch, batch processing46) Сахалин Р: business plan47) Сахалин Ю: business partners48) Макаров: Бритиш Петролеум49) SAP.тех. точка прерывания50) SAP.фин. Business Partner51) Имена и фамилии: Baden Powell, Barry Pennington, Beatrix Potter, Bernadette Peters, Brad Pitt52) Общественная организация: Beyond Pesticides53) Должность: Beyond Potential54) Чат: Beautiful Partner55) Единицы измерений: Before Present, Before The Present56) Международная торговля: Big Player -
3 Bp
1) Общая лексика: hum. сокр. Base Pair, начальный период (beginning period), передовая практика, оптимальная практика (best practice)2) Компьютерная техника: Basic Programs, Build Page, Business Portal3) Морской термин: ОП4) Медицина: Bodily Pain, bipolar disorder, blood pressure, binding potential, bullous pemphigoid5) Американизм: Brain Power6) Спорт: Ball Park, Ban Points, Baton Pass, Batting Practice, Battle Points, Belt Punch, Big Point, Bouncer Points, Bravery Points7) Военный термин: Battery Pack, Battle Power, Battlefield Position, Binding Post, Bow Problem, Brilliant Pebbles, Burning The Planet, back projection, base percussion, base plate, base procured, basic pay, battle position, beach party, black powder, blackout preparedness, blast propagation, border patrol, bypass8) Техника: Bloch point, Boolean processor, Bulk Pulverizer, band of performance, batch program, bearing pile, bill of parcels, bills-payable, bipolar, bit processing, blocking probability, bonded single paper, breakpoint, brick protected, bright plating, bulk processing, byte processing, водосброс, обходная выработка, перемычка, перепускное устройство, полосовой фильтр, сбросовый канал, ходок, шунт9) Шутливое выражение: Bad Petroleum, Boycott Petrol, Brain Poping, Bull Plop10) Математика: Bivariate Poisson, Branching Point11) Юридический термин: Bristol Police12) Бухгалтерия: Big Pockets, Billing Provider, Budget Power13) Фармакология: Британская фармакопея14) Биржевой термин: Basis Points15) Ветеринария: Bond Pair16) Грубое выражение: Baby Prostitute, Big Pimp, Bride Price17) Музыка: Bass Player18) Оптика: buff polish19) Политика: Solomon Islands20) Радио: Battery Powered21) Сокращение: Boiling Point, Brazilian Portuguese, Broken Pekoe, Bulk Posting, between perpendiculars, bolted plate, British Pharmacopoeia, back pressure22) Университет: Bonus Points23) Физика: Before Polarization24) Физиология: Blood Pollution, Body Part25) Электроника: Band Pass26) Вычислительная техника: back propagation, base pointer, указатель базы, Base Pointer (register, CPU, Intel, Assembler)27) Нефть: bridge plug, bulk plant, bull plug, базисный распределительный склад, барометрическое давление (barometric pressure), глухая башмачная насадка (blind plug), глухая пробка (blind plug), мостовая пробка (bridge plug), нефтебаза (bulk plant), обратное давление (back pressure), противодавление (back pressure)28) Стоматология: BOP, КЗ, индекс кровоточивости при зондировании, кровоточивость при зондировании, показатель кровоточивости при зондировании29) Картография: bearing picket, boundary post, by-pass30) Банковское дело: векселя к уплате (bills payable)31) Транспорт: Balanced Pistons32) Пищевая промышленность: Baked Potato, Black Pepper, British Pigs33) Парфюмерия: фармакопея Великобритании34) Фирменный знак: Blair Petroleum, Brass Plum, British Pharmaceutical35) Реклама: Патент Великобритании36) СМИ: Back Print, Begin Picture, Bermuda Press37) Деловая лексика: Best Product, Better Petroleum, Beyond Petroleum, Big Polluter, Business Plus, Business Population, Buying The Power38) Бурение: бирпо (Bearpaw; свита серии мотана верхнего отдела меловой системы), основание пенсильванской свиты (Base Pennsylvanian), распределительный склад (bulk plant)39) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Bid Packages & Procurement Services, температура кипения (boiling point), точка кипения (boiling point)40) Инвестиции: bills payable41) Сетевые технологии: Broken Proxy42) ЕБРР: Board package43) Полимеры: British Patent, British Petroleum, bandpass, base point, blast pressure, blueprint44) Программирование: Buffer Previous45) Автоматика: base pitch, batch processing46) Сахалин Р: business plan47) Сахалин Ю: business partners48) Макаров: Бритиш Петролеум49) SAP.тех. точка прерывания50) SAP.фин. Business Partner51) Имена и фамилии: Baden Powell, Barry Pennington, Beatrix Potter, Bernadette Peters, Brad Pitt52) Общественная организация: Beyond Pesticides53) Должность: Beyond Potential54) Чат: Beautiful Partner55) Единицы измерений: Before Present, Before The Present56) Международная торговля: Big Player -
4 bp
1) Общая лексика: hum. сокр. Base Pair, начальный период (beginning period), передовая практика, оптимальная практика (best practice)2) Компьютерная техника: Basic Programs, Build Page, Business Portal3) Морской термин: ОП4) Медицина: Bodily Pain, bipolar disorder, blood pressure, binding potential, bullous pemphigoid5) Американизм: Brain Power6) Спорт: Ball Park, Ban Points, Baton Pass, Batting Practice, Battle Points, Belt Punch, Big Point, Bouncer Points, Bravery Points7) Военный термин: Battery Pack, Battle Power, Battlefield Position, Binding Post, Bow Problem, Brilliant Pebbles, Burning The Planet, back projection, base percussion, base plate, base procured, basic pay, battle position, beach party, black powder, blackout preparedness, blast propagation, border patrol, bypass8) Техника: Bloch point, Boolean processor, Bulk Pulverizer, band of performance, batch program, bearing pile, bill of parcels, bills-payable, bipolar, bit processing, blocking probability, bonded single paper, breakpoint, brick protected, bright plating, bulk processing, byte processing, водосброс, обходная выработка, перемычка, перепускное устройство, полосовой фильтр, сбросовый канал, ходок, шунт9) Шутливое выражение: Bad Petroleum, Boycott Petrol, Brain Poping, Bull Plop10) Математика: Bivariate Poisson, Branching Point11) Юридический термин: Bristol Police12) Бухгалтерия: Big Pockets, Billing Provider, Budget Power13) Фармакология: Британская фармакопея14) Биржевой термин: Basis Points15) Ветеринария: Bond Pair16) Грубое выражение: Baby Prostitute, Big Pimp, Bride Price17) Музыка: Bass Player18) Оптика: buff polish19) Политика: Solomon Islands20) Радио: Battery Powered21) Сокращение: Boiling Point, Brazilian Portuguese, Broken Pekoe, Bulk Posting, between perpendiculars, bolted plate, British Pharmacopoeia, back pressure22) Университет: Bonus Points23) Физика: Before Polarization24) Физиология: Blood Pollution, Body Part25) Электроника: Band Pass26) Вычислительная техника: back propagation, base pointer, указатель базы, Base Pointer (register, CPU, Intel, Assembler)27) Нефть: bridge plug, bulk plant, bull plug, базисный распределительный склад, барометрическое давление (barometric pressure), глухая башмачная насадка (blind plug), глухая пробка (blind plug), мостовая пробка (bridge plug), нефтебаза (bulk plant), обратное давление (back pressure), противодавление (back pressure)28) Стоматология: BOP, КЗ, индекс кровоточивости при зондировании, кровоточивость при зондировании, показатель кровоточивости при зондировании29) Картография: bearing picket, boundary post, by-pass30) Банковское дело: векселя к уплате (bills payable)31) Транспорт: Balanced Pistons32) Пищевая промышленность: Baked Potato, Black Pepper, British Pigs33) Парфюмерия: фармакопея Великобритании34) Фирменный знак: Blair Petroleum, Brass Plum, British Pharmaceutical35) Реклама: Патент Великобритании36) СМИ: Back Print, Begin Picture, Bermuda Press37) Деловая лексика: Best Product, Better Petroleum, Beyond Petroleum, Big Polluter, Business Plus, Business Population, Buying The Power38) Бурение: бирпо (Bearpaw; свита серии мотана верхнего отдела меловой системы), основание пенсильванской свиты (Base Pennsylvanian), распределительный склад (bulk plant)39) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: Bid Packages & Procurement Services, температура кипения (boiling point), точка кипения (boiling point)40) Инвестиции: bills payable41) Сетевые технологии: Broken Proxy42) ЕБРР: Board package43) Полимеры: British Patent, British Petroleum, bandpass, base point, blast pressure, blueprint44) Программирование: Buffer Previous45) Автоматика: base pitch, batch processing46) Сахалин Р: business plan47) Сахалин Ю: business partners48) Макаров: Бритиш Петролеум49) SAP.тех. точка прерывания50) SAP.фин. Business Partner51) Имена и фамилии: Baden Powell, Barry Pennington, Beatrix Potter, Bernadette Peters, Brad Pitt52) Общественная организация: Beyond Pesticides53) Должность: Beyond Potential54) Чат: Beautiful Partner55) Единицы измерений: Before Present, Before The Present56) Международная торговля: Big Player -
5 GBL
1) Военный термин: ground-based laser2) Техника: ground based laser3) Химия: гамма-бутиролактон (ГБЛ) (gamma-Butyrolactone)4) Сокращение: Government Bill of Lading5) Транспорт: государственная транспортная накладная (government bill of lading)6) Деловая лексика: государственный коносамент (government bill of lading), Global Business Licence7) Расширение файла: Global module in Basic programs, Global definitions (VAXTPU editor)8) Аэропорты: Goulburn Island, Northern Territory, Australia9) НАСА: Great Big Lever -
6 GLB
1) Математика: нижняя грань (точная)2) Сокращение: glass block3) СМИ: Good Life Broadcasting4) Расширение файла: Global module in Basic programs5) Майкрософт: Акт Грэма-Лича-Блили (Акт о модернизации финансовой системы 1999 г.) -
7 GLO
1) Американизм: General Land Office2) Военный термин: Get the Lead Out, ground liaison officer3) Шутливое выражение: Goddesses Love Oranges4) Страхование: Great Lakes only5) Сокращение: Ground Liaison Officer (UK)6) Генетика: глиоксалаза7) Расширение файла: Global module in Basic programs, Auxiliary for for glossary (LaTeX)8) Аэропорты: Gloucester/ Cheltenham, England, UK9) AMEX. Global Ocean Carriers, LTD. -
8 Glo
1) Американизм: General Land Office2) Военный термин: Get the Lead Out, ground liaison officer3) Шутливое выражение: Goddesses Love Oranges4) Страхование: Great Lakes only5) Сокращение: Ground Liaison Officer (UK)6) Генетика: глиоксалаза7) Расширение файла: Global module in Basic programs, Auxiliary for for glossary (LaTeX)8) Аэропорты: Gloucester/ Cheltenham, England, UK9) AMEX. Global Ocean Carriers, LTD. -
9 glo
1) Американизм: General Land Office2) Военный термин: Get the Lead Out, ground liaison officer3) Шутливое выражение: Goddesses Love Oranges4) Страхование: Great Lakes only5) Сокращение: Ground Liaison Officer (UK)6) Генетика: глиоксалаза7) Расширение файла: Global module in Basic programs, Auxiliary for for glossary (LaTeX)8) Аэропорты: Gloucester/ Cheltenham, England, UK9) AMEX. Global Ocean Carriers, LTD. -
10 Bibliography
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(1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. 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Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.■ Schank, R. 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The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). 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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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11 BIOS
['baios] n. shkurtesë nga b asic i nput o utput s ystem ( BIOS) sistemi themelor për hyrje-dalje ( informatikë)What is BIOS?BIOS is an acronym for Basic Input/Output System. It is the boot firmware program on a PC, and controls the computer from the time you start it up until the operating system takes over. When you turn on a PC, the BIOS first conducts a basic hardware check, called a Power-On Self Test (POST), to determine whether all of the attachments are present and working. Then it loads the operating system into your computer's random access memory, or RAM.The BIOS also manages data flow between the computer's operating system and attached devices such as the hard disk, video card, keyboard, mouse, and printer.The BIOS stores the date, the time, and your system configuration information in a battery-powered, non-volatile memory chip, called a CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor) after its manufacturing process.Although the BIOS is standardized and should rarely require updating, some older BIOS chips may not accommodate new hardware devices. Before the early 1990s, you couldn't update the BIOS without removing and replacing its ROM chip. Contemporary BIOS resides on memory chips such as flash chips or EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory), so that you can update the BIOS yourself if necessary.For detailed information about BIOS updates, visit:What is firmware?Firmware consists of programs installed semi-permanently into memory, using various types of programmable ROM chips, such as PROMS, EPROMs, EEPROMs, and flash chips.Firmware is non-volatile, and will remain in memory after you turn the system off.Often, the term firmware is used to refer specifically to boot firmware, which controls a computer from the time that it is turned on until the primary operating system has taken over. Boot firmware's main function is to initialize the hardware and then to boot (load and execute) the primary operating system. On PCs, the boot firmware is usually referred to as the BIOS.What is the difference between memory and disk storage?Memory and disk storage both refer to internal storage space in a computer.The term memory usually means RAM (Random Access Memory). To refer to hard drive storage, the terms disk space or storage are usually used.Typically, computers have much less memory than disk space, because RAM is much more expensive per megabyte than a hard disk. Today, a typical desktop computer might come with 512MB of RAM, and a 40 gigabyte hard disk.Virtual memory is disk space that has been designated to act like RAM.Computers also contain a small amount of ROM, or read-only memory, containing permanent or semi-permanent (firmware) instructions for checking hardware and starting up the computer. On a PC, this is called the BIOS.What is RAM?RAM stands for Random Access Memory. RAM provides space for your computer to read and write data to be accessed by the CPU (central processing unit). When people refer to a computer's memory, they usually mean its RAM.New computers typically come with at least 256 megabytes (MB) of RAM installed, and can be upgraded to 512MB or even a gigabyte or more.If you add more RAM to your computer, you reduce the number of times your CPU must read data from your hard disk. This usually allows your computer to work considerably faster, as RAM is many times faster than a hard disk.RAM is volatile, so data stored in RAM stays there only as long as your computer is running. As soon as you turn the computer off, the data stored in RAM disappears.When you turn your computer on again, your computer's boot firmware (called BIOS on a PC) uses instructions stored semi-permanently in ROM chips to read your operating system and related files from the disk and load them back into RAM.Note: On a PC, different parts of RAM may be more or less easily accessible to programs. For example, cache RAM is made up of very high-speed RAM chips which sit between the CPU and main RAM, storing (i.e., caching) memory accesses by the CPU. Cache RAM helps to alleviate the gap between the speed of a CPU's megahertz rating and the ability of RAM to respond and deliver data. It reduces how often the CPU must wait for data from main memory.What is ROM?ROM is an acronym for Read-Only Memory. It refers to computer memory chips containing permanent or semi-permanent data. Unlike RAM, ROM is non-volatile; even after you turn off your computer, the contents of ROM will remain.Almost every computer comes with a small amount of ROM containing the boot firmware. This consists of a few kilobytes of code that tell the computer what to do when it starts up, e.g., running hardware diagnostics and loading the operating system into RAM. On a PC, the boot firmware is called the BIOS.Originally, ROM was actually read-only. To update the programs in ROM, you had to remove and physically replace your ROM chips. Contemporary versions of ROM allow some limited rewriting, so you can usually upgrade firmware such as the BIOS by using installation software. Rewritable ROM chips include PROMs (programmable read-only memory), EPROMs (erasable read-only memory), EEPROMs (electrically erasable programmable read-only memory), and a common variation of EEPROMs called flash memory.What is an ACPI BIOS?ACPI is an acronym that stands for Advanced Configuration and Power Interface, a power management specification developed by Intel, Microsoft, and Toshiba. ACPI support is built into Windows 98 and later operating systems. ACPI is designed to allow the operating system to control the amount of power provided to each device or peripheral attached to the computer system. This provides much more stable and efficient power management and makes it possible for the operating system to turn off selected devices, such as a monitor or CD-ROM drive, when they are not in use.ACPI should help eliminate computer lockup on entering power saving or sleep mode. This will allow for improved power management, especially in portable computer systems where reducing power consumption is critical for extending battery life. ACPI also allows for the computer to be turned on and off by external devices, so that the touch of a mouse or the press of a key will "wake up" the computer. This new feature of ACPI, called OnNow, allows a computer to enter a sleep mode that uses very little power.In addition to providing power management, ACPI also evolves the existing Plug and Play BIOS (PnP BIOS) to make adding and configuring new hardware devices easier. This includes support for legacy non-PnP devices and improved support for combining older devices with ACPI hardware, allowing both to work in a more efficient manner in the same computer system. The end result of this is to make the BIOS more PnP compatible.What is CMOS?CMOS, short for Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor, is a low-power, low-heat semiconductor technology used in contemporary microchips, especially useful for battery-powered devices. The specific technology is explained in detail at:http://searchsmb.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid44_gci213860,00.htmlMost commonly, though, the term CMOS is used to refer to small battery-powered configuration chips on system boards of personal computers, where the BIOS stores the date, the time, and system configuration details.How do I enter the Setup program in my BIOS?Warning: Your BIOS Setup program is very powerful. An incorrect setting could cause your computer not to boot properly. You should make sure you understand what a setting does before you change it.You can usually run Setup by pressing a special function key or key combination soon after turning on the computer, during its power-on self test (POST), before the operating system loads (or before the operating system's splash screen shows). During POST, the BIOS usually displays a prompt such as:Press F2 to enter SetupMany newer computers display a brief screen, usually black and white, with the computer manufacturer's logo during POST.Entering the designated keystroke will take you into the BIOS Setup. Common keystrokes to enter the BIOS Setup are F1, F2, F10, and Del.On some computers, such as some Gateway or Compaq computers, graphics appear during the POST, and the BIOS information is hidden. You must press Esc to make these graphics disappear. Your monitor will then display the correct keystroke to enter.Note: If you press the key too early or too often, the BIOS may display an error message. To avoid this, wait about five seconds after turning the power on, and then press the key once or twice.What's the difference between BIOS and CMOS?Many people use the terms BIOS (basic input/output system) and CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) to refer to the same thing. Though they are related, they are distinct and separate components of a computer. The BIOS is the program that starts a computer up, and the CMOS is where the BIOS stores the date, time, and system configuration details it needs to start the computer.The BIOS is a small program that controls the computer from the time it powers on until the time the operating system takes over. The BIOS is firmware, which means it cannot store variable data.CMOS is a type of memory technology, but most people use the term to refer to the chip that stores variable data for startup. A computer's BIOS will initialize and control components like the floppy and hard drive controllers and the computer's hardware clock, but the specific parameters for startup and initializing components are stored in the CMOS. -
12 program
программа; управляющая программа, УП || программировать; готовить УП- 3D machining programto download programs to individual machine controls — вводить УП ( из центральной ЭВМ системы) в УЧПУ отдельных станков
- absolute program
- ACC programs
- analysis programs
- application design automation program
- APT program
- APT source program
- assembly language program
- assembly program
- automated data preparation evaluation program
- automatic NC machining data generation programs
- automatic offset program
- auxiliary program
- axis driver scaling program
- basic control program
- BCL program
- benchmark program
- bureau computer program
- CAD program
- CAD/NC programs
- CAM-generated program
- canned generic NC program
- canned program
- cellular conversion program
- channel program
- circuit analysis program
- CNC inspection program
- CNC program
- CNC turning-center program
- collision-free program
- communication control program
- communications control program
- companion program
- compensation program
- complex tooling cost program
- component program
- computer program
- computer-aided design and evaluation program
- computer-stored part program
- consultation program
- contingency program
- continuous NC program
- contour milling program
- control I/O program
- control program
- control-resident program
- conversational program
- coolant-dispensing program
- cutter path program
- cutting program
- data editor program
- data fetch program
- data I/O program
- DCS program
- declarative program
- dexel program
- diagnosis program
- diagnostic program
- DMIS program
- DNC programs
- DOS program
- download program
- draft program
- edited program
- error-correcting program
- ESPRIT program
- evaluation program
- execute program
- executive program
- extension program
- externally generated program
- family program
- fault diagnosis program
- finished program
- finite-element program
- fixture-building program
- Fortran-based program
- functions program
- general program
- general-purpose program
- geometric modeling program
- goal-oriented program
- graphics program
- grinding program
- grinding wheel wear compensation program
- hard program
- hardwired program
- high priority program
- higher priority program
- ICAM programs
- implementation program
- incremental program
- initial loading program
- inspection program
- integer program
- interface program
- interpretative program
- interpreter program
- interpretive program
- jaw change program
- ladder logic program
- logic program
- low priority program
- lower priority program
- machine cutting program
- machine program
- machine tool program
- machining program
- main program
- maintenance programs
- malfunction analysis program
- management program
- manipulator-level program
- master program
- master software program
- MDI program
- measuring machine program
- mirror program
- MMS programs
- mode control program
- modeling program
- modified program
- monitoring program
- MS program
- MS-DOS programs
- multisequence program
- NC data generation programs
- NC program
- NC tape program
- NC verification program
- nonresident diagnostic program
- nonresident diagnostics program
- numerical control program
- numerically intensive program
- occupational health program
- occupational safety program
- off-line diagnostic program
- one-to-one program
- operator-activated program
- optimizing program
- order-picking program
- palletizing program
- part inspection program
- part program
- part-family program
- part-plan program
- pass through program
- path calculation program
- PC vision programs
- peripheral support program
- pilot program
- plain language program
- plugboard program
- postprocessor programs
- preprepared program
- preselected program
- preset program
- priority program
- production program
- proved program
- proven part program
- punched tape program
- quality programs
- read-in program
- refining program
- requesting part program
- returning control program
- reverse program
- robot control program
- robot execution program
- robot program
- rule-based program
- running program
- scaling program
- scheduling program
- sequential program
- service program
- simulation program
- SMSG program
- software control programs
- software programs
- source program
- SPC program
- spreadsheet program
- spreadsheet-based program
- standard machining program
- standard program
- stored program
- stress analysis program
- structural optimization program
- swarf-clearing program
- system program
- system's executive program
- tape program
- task program
- task-level program
- teaching operations function program
- temporary diagnostic program
- test program
- testing program
- thread program
- three-dimensional surface program
- time program
- tolerancing program
- tool animation program
- tool management program
- tooling program
- tool-plan program
- tool-setting program
- tool-tracking program
- tracing program
- trajectory translator program
- turnkey programs
- type-related program
- unproved program
- upload program
- up-to-date program
- user friendly program
- user I/O program
- user-extension program
- user-written program
- utility program
- vehicular behavior analysis program
- work program
- working program
- workpiece program
- workstation programEnglish-Russian dictionary of mechanical engineering and automation > program
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13 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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14 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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15 Computers
The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)[Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.Further, the effects of those ideas are rapidly compounding, because a computer design is itself just a set of ideas. As we get better at manipulating ideas by building ever better computers, we get better at building even better computers-it's an ever-escalating upward spiral. The early nineteenth century, when the computer's story began, is already so far back that it may as well be the Stone Age. (Rawlins, 1997, p. 19)According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computers
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16 partner recognition layout
рекламно-информационный материал о партнерах
В основе признания партнеров лежит рекламно-информационный материал о партнерах, который должен присутствовать во всех публикациях ОКОИ, в том числе во всех выпусках информационного бюллетеня (журнала) Оргкомитета, в путеводителях для зрителей, путеводителях для прессы и СМИ, транспортных схемах, путеводителях для партнеров,брошюрах о продаже билетов, путеводителе для Олимпийской / Паралимпийской Семьи, Программах церемоний официального открытия и закрытия Игр, Официальных сувенирных программах, информационных брошюрах, путеводителях по объектам Игр, официальных путеводителях по Играм, финальных отчетах, памятных книгах, специальных публикациях, а также на веб-сайте ОКОИ, на рекламных щитах, баннерах, флагах, посвященных признанию партнеров и т.д.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]EN
partner recognition layout
Basic partner recognition layout is the foundation of the OCOG's partners recognition plan; it should appear in every OCOG publication including, but not limited to all issues of the OCOG newsletter / magazine, spectator guides, press / media guides, media transport guide, partner guides for media, ticket sales brochures, Olympic / Paralympic Family guide, Official OC / CC ceremonies programs, Official souvenir programs, Games information brochures, venue guides, official Games guides, final reports, commemorative books, signature property publications, etc., as well as, the OCOG's website, on-site partner recognition totems / boards, banners, flags, etc.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]Тематики
EN
Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > partner recognition layout
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17 Culture FA (CUL)
- функция «Культура»
функция «Культура»
ФНД «Культура» отвечает за развитие и успешную реализацию следующих культурных программ: работа площадки прямых трансляций в Олимпийском парке, проведение Культурной Олимпиады и других культурных мероприятий в Олимпийской и Паралимпийской деревнях. ФНД «Культура» также координирует реализацию других культурных программ, таких, как оборудование площадок прямых трансляций в городе-организаторе, культурные программы для волонтеров и другие мероприятия в Олимпийском парке. Кроме того, ФНД «Культура» отвечает за освещение и предоставление базовой информации о своей деятельности на специальном веб-сайте.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]EN
Culture FA (CUL)
Culture FA is responsible for the development and successful realization of the following cultural programs: Live site in OP, Cultural Olympiad and cultural activities in Olympic and Paralympic villages. Culture FA will also coordinate other cultural programs realization such as live sites in the city, cultural program for volunteers and other activities in OP. Culture FA will also be coordinating online coverage and basic information of the FA activities provision via dedicated website.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]Тематики
EN
Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > Culture FA (CUL)
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18 BPD
1) Авиация: engine bypass duct3) Военный термин: Business Programs Division, basic planning document, basic point defense4) Техника: battery-powered device, boost-phase discrimination5) Шутливое выражение: Bitter Phony Doctor6) Математика: априорное биномиальное распределение (binomial prior distribution)7) Грубое выражение: Butt Plugging Dave8) Сокращение: базовые проектные данные9) Физиология: Bi Polar Disorder, Biparietal Diameter, Body Part Discomfort10) Нефть: баррелей в сутки (barrels per day), суточная добыча в баррелях, суточная добыча нефти в баррелях, число баррелей в сутки (barrels per day)11) Педиатрия: БЛД (bronchopulmonary dysplasia), бронхолёгочная дисплазия12) Экология: Biocidal Products Directive (Европейская система данных о химических веществах (ESIS))13) Нефтегазовая техника суточная добыча [нефти] в баррелях14) Полимеры: barrels per day, boost pressure difference15) Ядерная физика: Beam Positioning Drive16) Контроль качества: binomial prior distribution17) Пивное производство: oписание процесса пивоварения (Brewing Process Descriptions)18) Нефть и газ: барр./сутки19) Электротехника: bushing potential device -
19 Bpd
1) Авиация: engine bypass duct3) Военный термин: Business Programs Division, basic planning document, basic point defense4) Техника: battery-powered device, boost-phase discrimination5) Шутливое выражение: Bitter Phony Doctor6) Математика: априорное биномиальное распределение (binomial prior distribution)7) Грубое выражение: Butt Plugging Dave8) Сокращение: базовые проектные данные9) Физиология: Bi Polar Disorder, Biparietal Diameter, Body Part Discomfort10) Нефть: баррелей в сутки (barrels per day), суточная добыча в баррелях, суточная добыча нефти в баррелях, число баррелей в сутки (barrels per day)11) Педиатрия: БЛД (bronchopulmonary dysplasia), бронхолёгочная дисплазия12) Экология: Biocidal Products Directive (Европейская система данных о химических веществах (ESIS))13) Нефтегазовая техника суточная добыча [нефти] в баррелях14) Полимеры: barrels per day, boost pressure difference15) Ядерная физика: Beam Positioning Drive16) Контроль качества: binomial prior distribution17) Пивное производство: oписание процесса пивоварения (Brewing Process Descriptions)18) Нефть и газ: барр./сутки19) Электротехника: bushing potential device -
20 bpd
1) Авиация: engine bypass duct3) Военный термин: Business Programs Division, basic planning document, basic point defense4) Техника: battery-powered device, boost-phase discrimination5) Шутливое выражение: Bitter Phony Doctor6) Математика: априорное биномиальное распределение (binomial prior distribution)7) Грубое выражение: Butt Plugging Dave8) Сокращение: базовые проектные данные9) Физиология: Bi Polar Disorder, Biparietal Diameter, Body Part Discomfort10) Нефть: баррелей в сутки (barrels per day), суточная добыча в баррелях, суточная добыча нефти в баррелях, число баррелей в сутки (barrels per day)11) Педиатрия: БЛД (bronchopulmonary dysplasia), бронхолёгочная дисплазия12) Экология: Biocidal Products Directive (Европейская система данных о химических веществах (ESIS))13) Нефтегазовая техника суточная добыча [нефти] в баррелях14) Полимеры: barrels per day, boost pressure difference15) Ядерная физика: Beam Positioning Drive16) Контроль качества: binomial prior distribution17) Пивное производство: oписание процесса пивоварения (Brewing Process Descriptions)18) Нефть и газ: барр./сутки19) Электротехника: bushing potential device
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